In January 2013 I questioned my employer, UCL's, decision to accept $10 million of funding from the Anglo-Australian multinational mining and petroleum company BHP Billiton to create an International Energy Policy Institute in Adelaide, and the Institute for Sustainable Resources in London at the Bartlett Faculty of the Built Environment. At the time, I was Vice Dean of Research and my questions started a process which is figured here as a site-writing, articulated through two registers: bios -a set of diary entries noting personal anxieties and hopes related to my institutional role at UCL, and logos -an attempt to relate these issues to the development of my own intellectual work and concepts concerning ethics and critique generated by others.
Bios, Critique, Ethics, Feminist Figuration, Logos, Sustainability, Site-Writing.
In 2014 Cornell University set up an ethics hotline using regulatory compliance software provided by US-based corporation EthicsPoint, Inc to provide 'a simple, anonymous way to confidentially report activities that may involve certain improper conduct or violations of Cornell University's Policies'.
1 This is but one indication of how ethical concerns have risen up the agenda in current institutional cultures, manifest in universities as well as the built environment professions. What we are witnessing is the creation of new ethical codes, policies, and procedures as well as the establishment of think tanks and commissions for debating ethical practice. My own 'practise of ethics' began back in January 2013, when I questioned UCL's decision to accept $10 million of funding from the Anglo-Australian multinational mining and petroleum company BHP Billiton to create an International Energy Policy Institute in Adelaide, and the Institute for Sustainable Resources in London at the Bartlett Faculty of the Built Environment, of which I was then Vice Dean of Research. My questions started a process which is figured here as a site-writing, articulated through two registers: bios -a set of diary entries noting personal anxieties and hopes related to my institutional role at UCL, and logos -an attempt to relate these issues to the development of my own intellectual work and concepts concerning ethics and critique generated by others (Rendell, 2010) .
January 2013
The fear that woke my stomach, reaches my head. Wide-awake 
Relational Critique
If criticism can be defined by the purpose of providing a commentary on a cultural work then criticism always has an 'other' in mind. The central task of criticism might then be considered as: how does one relate to an 'other'? Grounded in the object relations theory of D. W. Winnicott, the psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin (1988: xii) argues that the central task of psychoanalysis is the 'double task of recognition: how analyst and patient make known their own subjectivity and recognize the other's'. 
April 2013

Institutional Critique
Benjamin Buchloh (1990) coined the term 'institutional critique' to describe a strand of conceptual practice developed through the work of artists such as Hans Haacke and Michael Asher in the 1960s and 1970s. In the Claire Copley Gallery, Los Angeles (1974), for example, Asher removed the partition between the office and exhibition space, revealing to the public viewer the usually hidden operations that allow the gallery to function economically (Buchloh, 1984: 76-84 
Site-Writing
Feminists, such as Donna Haraway (1988) , have developed conceptual tools such as 'standpoint theory' and 'situated knowledge', for exploring how ways of knowing and being are culturally and spatially constructed. Site-writing is the name I have given to a practice I have initiated which draws attention to the situatedness of critical knowledge. 8 I am interested in how criticism as a practice performs acts of interpretation, produced by, and in turn productive of, the changing positions and sites we occupy -materially, conceptually, emotionally and ideologically -as critics. Sitewriting responds to Howard Caygill's (1988: 34, 64, 79) notion of strategic critique where a position of judgement is advanced through the process of criticizing, and parallels Gavin Butt's (2005: 7) 'call for … a mode of contemporary criticality' which is 'apprehended within -and instanced as -the performative act of critical engagement itself'.
June 2013 As Vice Dean of Research, and having been tasked in January 2013 to 'own' the risk of research expansion, I suggested the need for the following three documents: 1. The Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) due diligence procedures to be undertaken when deciding whether to accept the funds. 2. The structures and procedures in place to protect academic independence and integrity. 3. The performance indicators to monitor how this corporation has been changed by its engagement with UCL. […]
Feminist Figurations
A key aspect of situated knowledge is the locatedness of personal experience, and the relation of one person's knowledge, understanding and experience to another, which brings us very much into the field of life-writing, biography and autobiography. The oral historian Linda Sandino (2013: 9) draws on the work of Paul Ricoeur to consider how different forms of figuration operate in narration, relating the act of telling to the told, such that oral history might be itself understood as 'a double interpretive operation in which the narrator recapitulates the told in the telling.' Following Ricoeur, she describes: the individual in interpreting his or her life 'appears both as a reader and writer,' and the 'story of a life continues to be refigured by all the truthful and fictive stories a subject tells about himself or herself…a life is not "how it was" but how it is interpreted and reinterpreted, told and re-told' (Sandino, 2013: 9) . And in the feminist figurations of Donna Haraway and Rosi Braidotti spatial arrangements are an intrinsic aspect of their story-telling function; specifically the role of actual locations, and the cartographies of power relations and the differing positionalities they generate. Braidotti writes:
Figurations are not mere metaphors, but rather markers of more concretely situated historical positions. A figuration is the expression of one's specific positioning in space and time. It marks certain territorial or geopolitical coordinates, but it also points out one's sense of genealogy of historical inscription. Figurations deterritorialize and destabilize the certainties of the subject and allow for a proliferation of situated or 'micro' narratives of self and others. Critique as Crisis Roland Barthes (1982 Barthes ( [1971 : 379) comments that 'to criticize means to call into crisis'. To consider critique as crisis closely mirrored my state of mind when I chose to step down, so fearful was I of institutional repercussions. I was in crisis at the time, doubting my actions, and feeling panic going through me like electricity each time I spoke out. 
July 2013 Following my formal act of 'stepping-down', I met various senior managers at UCL to discuss my decision. To my surprise they all showed support for the work I had been doing on reputational risk and expressed an interest in involving me in developing UCL's ethical procedures and structures. In an act of what I now see as a 'stepping up', I put forward several proposals for action -that
Constructive Institutional Critique
Artist/architect Apolonija Šušteršic (1999: 56) has suggested that institutional critique 'doesn't produce any constructive resolution, when it doesn't effect changes in our political and cultural structures'. Her comment was made in conversation with the curator Maria Lind, who has put forward the idea of 'constructive institutional critique' to describe the work of Šušteršic and others, which, rather than being 'based on negativity … offer[s] a proposal for change, possibly an improvement, or a test of how to do things slightly differently … based on dialogue between the artist and the institution, rather than an inherent conflict' (Šušteršic , 1999: 56 
Transversality in the Group
Winnicott's idea of the transitional object that exists between mother and child was an inspiration for philosopher Félix Guattari's concept of the institutional object in his work on transversality and psychiatry (Guattari 1984 . Guattari (1996 : 63) argues that dual relations are always triangular in character, noting that 'there is always in a real situation a mediating object that acts as an ambiguous support or medium'. Guattari calls this third factor the institutional object (Genosko, 2002: 69) . His philosophy proposes a new concept: 'transversality in the group', an 'unconscious source of action', which carries a group's desire, 'a dimension opposite and complementary to the structures that generate pyramidal hierarchisation' (Guattari 1984 : 18, 22). For Guattari transversality provides the possibility of bringing the 'institutional context, its constraints, organization, practices, etc., all those things and relations which normally exist in the background' into the foreground for critique (Genosko, 2002: 70) .
July 2014 I have found others who are fascinated in a range of ethical issues, some with quite different perspectives to my own, but who also wish to look at the UCL's governance structures guiding ethical issues, and at how ethics is configured through different practices and disciplines -pedagogical and professional -in built environment research. To pursue such interests, I have put together a research proposal for a year-long project, and applied -successfully -for some internal funding from the Bartlett Small Grants Scheme. As well as involving a participant from each part of the Bartlett, and advisors from across UCL, the project will employ researchers to map those areas of UCL, which engage specifically in ethics, involving discourse analysis, literature reviews, ethnographic interviews, and seminars, ending in June with a twoday international conference, Practising Ethics, where speakers from academia and industry, including architects, artists, environmental scientists, fiction writers, and urban planners, will offer their ethical viewpoints through panel sessions and round tables.
10
The 'art of not being governed quite so much' In Judith Butler's (2002: 212) close analysis of Michel Foucault's 1978 lecture 'What is Critique' from The Politics of Truth, she notes how 'critique is always a critique of some instituted practice, discourse, episteme, institution, and it loses it character the moment in which it is abstracted from its operation and made to stand alone as a purely generalizable practice'. She talks of how, for Foucault, 'critique is precisely a practice that not only suspends judgment … but offers a new practice of values based on that very suspension'. Butler points to the way in which the practice of critique emerges from 'the tear in the fabric of our epistemological web', and outlines that, for Foucault, this exposure of the limit of the epistemological field is linked with the practice of virtue, 'as if virtue is counter to regulation and order, as if virtue itself is to be found in the risking of established order'. According to Foucault, the 'signature mark' of the critical attitude and its particular virtue is governance, 'how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them'. 'I would therefore propose', says Foucault (2007: 45) , 'as a very first definition of critique, this general characterization: the art of not being governed quite so much'. Rabinow (1997: xix) , 'who one is […] emerges acutely out of the problems with which one struggles'. Rabinow discusses how Foucault saw this as an attitude 'rooted in an ethics and not a morality, a practice rather than a vantage point, an active experience, rather than a passive waiting'. 
March 2015
January 2015
Giving an Account of Oneself
In Giving an Account of Oneself Butler (2005: 8) argues that 'the "I" has no story of its own that is not also the story of a relation -or set of relations -to a set of norms'. She goes on to note that: 'If the "I" is not at one with moral norms', this means that 'the subject must deliberate upon these norms', and that part of such a deliberation will 'entail a critical understanding' of the social genesis and meaning of those norms. Butler writes:
In this sense ethical deliberation is bound up with the operation of critique. And critique finds that it cannot go forward without a consideration of how the deliberating subject comes into being and how a deliberating subject might actually live or appropriate a set of norms. Not only does ethics find itself embroiled in the task of social theory, but social theory, if it is to yield nonviolent results, must find a place for this 'I'. (2005: 8) October 2015 
Parrhesia
In the autumn of 1983, Foucault gave six lectures at the University of California, Berkeley exploring the practice of parrhesia in the Greek culture of the fourth and fifth centuries BC. He examined the evolution of the term with respect to rhetoric, politics, and philosophy, and investigating the link between parrhesia and concepts of frankness, truth, danger, criticism, and duty. Foucault summarises his thinking from the first few lectures as follows:
parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty. More precisely, parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself 
Bios and Logos
Towards this later lectures on parrhesia, Foucault turns to examine the function of parrhesia in terms of the crisis of democratic institutions, and then moves on to discuss how parrhesia occurs as an activity in human relations, with respect to oneself and the care of the self, and in relation to others, specifically through three kinds of relation: individual personal, community and public life. Here Foucault talks of how, in the shift from a political to a Socratic or ethical form of parrhesia, the relation between logos, truth and courage alters to include bios, and to focus on the balance between bios and logos with respect to truth:
Here, giving an account of your life, your bios, is also not to give a narrative of the historical events that have taken place in your life, but rather to demonstrate whether you are able to show that there is a relation between the rational discourse, the logos, you are able to use, and the way that you live. Socrates is inquiring into the way that logos gives form to a person's style of life; for he is interested in discovering whether there is a harmonic relation between the two. (Foucault, 1999: np) Notes 1. With thanks to Jae Emerling for his excellent suggestion for the title; to my partner David Cross, whose way of going about the world as an artist and environmentalist is a source of constant inspiration to me; to Lucy Bleach, Dorita Hannah, Stephen Loo, John Vella and Kit Wise of the School of Performing Arts and the Creative Exchange Institute, University of Tasmania, for hosting me as 'Thinker in Residence' in November 2015, and whose support, spirit and generosity provided me with the time, space and presence of mind to think and write this essay; and to Alan Penn, Dean of the Bartlett, who has continued to offer support -professional and financial -for this ethical project.
